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Abstract
This Special Issue of Global Media and China responds in part to Stuart Hall’s famous 1996 
invocation, ‘Who needs identity?’ – to study ‘specific enunciative strategies’ utilized within 
‘specific modalities of power’ so as to consider identity discourses of the present and of the 
future. This issue draws upon empirical observations presented and debated at the 2019 
Chinese Internet Research Conference held in Singapore in May 2019, as well as theoretical 
contributions in identity politics and social media, the chosen site or ‘modality of power’. 
This editorial and critical essay reflects upon, complemented and supported by the papers 
in this issue, the critical and conceptual frameworks that are emerging to critique the global 
and local complexities, diversity and dynamics resulting from the deeper integration of social 
media into the everyday lives of Chinese Internet users. It presents an overview of the 2019 
Chinese Internet Research Conference proceedings in terms of how social media is used to 
wrap personal politics into a widening range of identity groupings around gender, class, citizens, 
pop culture and religion in ways that signal the future of newer forms of identity politics 
among Internet users in China. Since social media posts and exchanges, while geographically 
sourced and situated, often transcend their boundaries, the arguments presented here goes 
beyond China and are global. The shareability of identity mediated by individual, state and 
public discourses on social and ‘anti-social’ media during the COVID-19 pandemic within China, 
Singapore and Australia leads to novel ways of understanding identity politics in globalizing 
China and strategic uses of Chinese identity.
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Introduction: identity discourses
Precisely because identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need to understand them as 
produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, 
by specific enunciative strategies. Moreover, they emerge within the play of specific modalities of power, 
and are thus more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an 
identical, naturally-constituted unity – an ‘identity’ in its traditional meaning (that is, an all-inclusive 
sameness, seamless, without internal differentiation). (Hall, 1996, p. 4; parentheses in original)
The late Stuart Hall, widely regarded as one of the pioneers of cultural theory, authored perhaps 
one of the most influential essays dealing with the subject of identity back in 1996 (in Questions of 
Cultural Identity, edited by Hall & du Gay, 1996). Simply entitled ‘Introduction: Who Needs 
‘Identity’?’, Hall (1996) argued convincingly that identities are ‘increasingly fragmented and frac-
tured’, and they are ‘never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and 
antagonistic, discourses, practices, and positions’ (p. 4). Above all, they are ‘subject to a radical 
historicization, and are constantly in the process of change and transformation’ (Hall, 1996). Hall’s 
key message, which resonated with many global media and cultural studies scholars since, was that 
identities are constituted within, not outside of the sphere of representation. It follows therefore 
that to make sense of identity (or identities, in plural), we need to look at specific historical and 
institutional sites to ascertain and make sense of how, when, where and why identities form and 
emerge.
This Special Issue of Global Media and China responds in part to Hall’s (1996) invocation – 
cited in the opening quote to this editorial article – to study ‘specific enunciative strategies’ utilized 
within ‘specific modalities of power’ so as to consider identity discourses of the present and of the 
future. This issue draws upon empirical observations presented and debated at the 2019 Chinese 
Internet Research Conference (CIRC 2019) held in Singapore in May 2019, as well as theoretical 
contributions in identity politics and social media, which is the chosen site or ‘modality of power’ 
in this instance. Specifically, this editorial article, complemented and supported by the papers in 
this issue, seeks to provide critical and conceptual frameworks to critique the global and local 
complexities, diversity and dynamics resulting from the deeper integration of social media into the 
everyday lives of Chinese Internet users. It presents an overview of the CIRC 2019 proceedings in 
terms of how social media is used to wrap personal politics into a widening range of identity group-
ings around gender, class, citizens, pop culture and religion in ways that signal the future of newer 
forms of identity politics among Internet users in China. Since social media posts and exchanges, 
while geographically sourced and situated, often transcend their boundaries, the arguments pre-
sented here goes beyond China and are global.
Globally, 57% of people are now connected to the Internet, with Internet users spending more 
time on social media than on other digital activities in 2019 (Kemp, 2019). With more than two-
thirds of the planet using mobile phones, we live in digital, networked societies (Castells, 2000) in 
which people are ‘permanently online’ (Turkle, 2008). Internet-enabled social media platforms are 
communicative, open and participatory, support communities and provide connectivity for people 
across cultures, national borders and markets (Siapera, 2018). Connected by new media platforms, 
Internet users form, engage and actively participate in virtual communities in a variety of ways 
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(Rice & Fuller, 2013). Internet users communicate their individual and group identities online, cre-
ate and share digital media and manage their relations with diverse others online in ways that may 
extend or differ from their sociality in offline settings, cultures and national identities (see Birnie 
& Horvath, 2002; Hung, 2002).
Under the larger – and arguably primaeval – discourse of identity, some Internet studies scholars 
explore the fluid nature of self-identity (e.g. rise of selfie culture; Couldry’s (2012) notion of ‘pres-
encing’), such as gender, and ethnic identity that reproduce or challenge traditional social hierar-
chies (Senft & Noble, 2013; Wajcman, 2010); and also, new forms of sociality (e.g. 
computer-mediated social communication) and virtual communities (Calhoun, 2002). Others focus 
on diasporic uses in Western societies (e.g. Parker & Song, 2007; Siapera, 2007) or participatory 
media of fans in the West (e.g. Jenkins et al., 2013) and in China (Zhang & Mao, 2013). However, 
few studies touch on how social media use affects these aspects of identity, social relations and 
participation in larger, loosely networked social movements among Chinese netizens.
For this Special Issue that emerged out of the 17th Chinese Internet Research Conference held 
in Singapore on 28 June 2019, we seek to plug this critical ‘identity’ gap. We examine the impact 
of Chinese users’ engagement with social media tools and apps that speak to the discourse of iden-
tity formation, movements and community interactions, particularly among contemporary Chinese 
and diasporic Chinese communities. There are two reasons for this, both of which are historically 
and institutionally grounded (Hall, 1996). First, China’s rising global economic power and domi-
nance in information and communications technology (ICT) industries make it pertinent to study 
digital cultures emerging in China (Zhang, 2016). It is a rapidly developing country that has 
embraced new ICT and social media technologies across the country in less than two decades, 
which is a relatively short period of time. The Chinese state’s cultivation of a giant ‘walled garden’ 
of Internet infrastructure has provided an impetus and incentive for growing Chinese social media 
platforms and apps such as RenRen, Wechat, Weibo, Douban, Sohu, TikTok that are an alternative 
universe to Western-dominated technology and new media giants Facebook and Google, in the 
global Internet space outside of China. This mirrors the Chinese IT industry’s growing leadership 
in building 5G infrastructure and networks, as well as a host of other digital communication tech-
nologies globally. Second, China as a society is going through dramatic changes due to the politi-
cal, economic and technological shifts the country is experiencing (which is now poised to intensify 
in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic that swept through the world in the first half of 2020).
Early predictions are that China’s Internet users will continue to increase their average daily 
time spent from 3 hours 25 minutes to more than 4 hours in 2021 (Dolliver, 2019). However, with 
the unexpected impact of COVID-19 pandemic, globally, extraordinary levels of information and 
media content are flowing through all communication channels including social media engage-
ment increasing by 61% and web browsing rising to 70% (KANTAR Media, 2020). Web users 
have forcibly become accustomed to working from home, learning online and navigating new 
iterations of e-commerce services. In other words, much of their daily experiences will be medi-
ated through Internet activities on multiple screens. This increased multi-screen time is expected to 
magnify existing tensions and complications wrought by juxtaposing their past and the present 
memories, traditional and the modern modes of influence and social relations, exemplified in part 
via a Chinese versus global cultures online discourse. This provides an opportunity for us to exam-
ine the contrasts and similarities that Chinese and diasporic Chinese online communities have on 
the formation of Chinese identities, group behaviours and distinctively online Chinese communi-
ties. Rich insights into emerging social movements, Chinese fandoms, new ‘micro-celebrities’ and 
digital sub-cultures may illuminate new ways of thinking and seeing China and Chinese cultures 
and deepen understanding diasporic notions of ‘Chinese-ness’ in places outside of China. Hence, 
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while the papers featured in this issue may be China-centric, their identity implications of ‘same-
ness’ extend far beyond just China.
The papers included in this Special Issue understand social media platforms, apps and tools 
from the audiences’, users’ and participants’ perspectives, rather than at a technological level. This 
is important because discourses of identities and identity movements are generated by human inter-
actions and enunciations; they do not reside in technologies per se. Each of the papers presented in 
this volume tackle the challenge of identifying what the real-time features of China’s evolving 
digital cultures are and seek to better understand Chinese Internet users as online communities, 
(inter)active audiences and critical meaning-makers.
Social media and identity movements: issues emerging from the 
papers
This Special Issue examines how virtual communities and new ‘social movements’ use China’s 
social media apps to galvanize civic participation and influence social relations as a form of iden-
tity discourse to address their aspirations, anxieties and fears. It interrogates how ‘Digital China’ 
(Schneider, 2018) is complex and constantly changing in terms of how Chinese Internet audiences 
use digital technologies to respond strategically to global social changes from those reflecting 
more conservative to more liberal worldviews.
Examining the nature of virtual communities in digital China, the first paper takes on a gender-
based push for modernity in the #MeToo feminist space in China, coupled with digital capitalism 
(see Han, 2018; Wang & Driscoll, 2019). While many attributed the contemporary #MeToo move-
ment to the landmark revelation of the sexual harassment, assault and abuse of women to the pros-
ecution of the infamous Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein, the phrase has its origins in 2006 
on social media (Grady, 2020). It was created by an African-American activist Tamara Burke who 
encountered many young ordinary American women who had been subjected to sexual abuse and 
exploitation by men (Olheiser, 2017). However, gender exploitation can develop in surprisingly 
complex ways. In the paper, ‘The Big Women: A Textual Analysis of Chinese Viewers’ Perception 
towards Femvertising Vlogs’, Duan Xu evaluates viewers’ perception of female vloggers’ authen-
ticity on social media against the backdrop of a consumption-based ‘attention economy’ in China. 
Video blogging – commonly referred to as ‘vlogging’ – is a type of self-recorded short video that 
documents people’s daily lives that has become an emerging form of digital cultural production on 
social media platforms in China. Small groups of vloggers have taken to becoming ‘new-rich’ 
micro-celebrities, also known as influencers in other social media contexts, by developing a fol-
lowing of viewers who identify with their lifestyles and aesthetics. This study helps us understand 
how Chinese viewers make sense of vlogs that perpetuate the myth of female (self-)empowerment 
through consumption on sites like Weibo. Among other things, it argues that many of these vlogs 
enunciate a symbolic, yet ephemeral, form of relationship between content creators, brands and 
consumers who claim to promote women empowerment. This paper reflects a more pro-active, 
nuanced understanding of Chinese social media users’ own subjectivities of conformity and indi-
vidualism, playing on elements that are common but important in gender politics.
Virtual communities mediate the effects of pop culture as online groups use digital technologies 
to play and share their social affiliations (e.g. Zhang & Zhang, 2015). Through consuming content 
about entertainment celebrities, religion and expensive cars, the community members’ digital 
media use affects their attitudes and behaviour towards other Internet users. The papers that follow 
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examine the identity politics around motivations, uses and challenges faced by these Chinese social 
media ‘produsers’ (Bruns, 2007, p. 2) to define and contest the boundaries around their online 
activities. The second paper is a comparative analysis of Chinese and Russian social media posts 
entitled ‘Online Scrutiny of People with “Nice Cars: A Comparative Analysis of Chinese, Russian, 
and Anglo-American Outrage”’, co-authored by Qian Huang, Rashid Gabdulhakov and Daniel 
Trottier. The paper shows how online community criticism of Internet users posting ‘nice cars’ on 
various social platforms leads to both similarities and contrasting online viewpoints. Such out-
comes are made possible by increasing media platform connectedness, and the ubiquity of mobile 
recording devices, allowing social media users to conduct near-constant mutual scrutiny. Such 
mediated scrutiny sometimes escalates to public denunciations online and even mediated or 
embodied interventions and digital vigilantism (Trottier, 2017). A recurring theme of such scrutiny 
can be observed not only on Chinese social media, but also on social media in Russia and else-
where, in which hostility is openly expressed towards people with ‘nice’ (i.e. late model, luxury, 
foreign) cars. In these cases, nice cars are not merely a ‘fact’ provided by participants in their 
denunciations; they also serve as an implication of the privileges the owners might possess, such 
as capital, status and social connections. One of the strengths of this piece is in the juxtapositioning 
of cases in China against other geopolitical contexts to examine how online scrutiny is expressed 
and used to regulate and moderate against perceived attempts to assert social-economic hierarchies 
online. Included in this paper are comparative analyses of media content and public discourses on 
the subject on platforms such as Sina Weibo (China), YouTube (Russia) and Facebook (United 
Kingdom; Australia; Canada; United States). The research demonstrates the various forms of criti-
cal and populist sentiments that are shaped by unique socio-cultural identities and political con-
texts, and how they share both commonalities and differences in expressions of identities.
Extending popular culture into fandom of an esoteric realm, the third paper in this issue – 
‘Social media, religion and shifting boundaries in globalizing China’ by Sng Bee Bee and Francis 
Lee – takes an innovative approach to the study of the social media use, religion and China. It 
examines how and why religious communities use social media and the Internet to share various 
issues surrounding religion in China. Importantly, it considers the responses to the formation of 
online religious communities or perhaps socio-religious networking sites. This study engages par-
ticipants to discuss the components of such identities – akin to applying the discourse of ‘presenc-
ing’ (a la Couldry, 2012) – of such a sense of belonging, communication and interaction as well as 
norms, beliefs and conformity in the online group. As the authors contend in their paper, the use of 
social media and the Internet for religious purposes also raises several socio-cultural and practical 
issues. First, it gives rise to the debate around how the actual contours of private and secular 
boundaries are drawn, particularly since lines are blurred or not distinct in the online space. In 
social networking sites, users typically move seamlessly in talking about various issues like poli-
tics and current affairs, with religion included when it is conveyed as a form of popular culture. In 
communicating about their beliefs, along with associated social and cultural activities, members of 
these social media and networking sites ultimately seek to construct group solidarity and forge 
their identities.
Sng and Lee’s paper leads us back to an examination of how public opinion in social media 
spaces is sustained by discussions in more traditional media channels. The fourth paper, entitled 
‘The “Implied Truth, Complementary Media Practices and Successful Atomized Activism in 
China” by Xi Yipeng, discusses how Chinese social media, along with traditional media, acts as a 
complementary space for voicing citizen opinions and mobilizing social support. In doing so, 
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social media interventions facilitate the mobilization of participants at the initial stages of collec-
tive and atomized activism, which conforms to research that shows that social media has great 
potential for collective mobilization by lowering the costs of information acquisition and participa-
tion. However, the paper cautions against thinking that the popularity of social media renders mass 
media irrelevant to collective mobilization, even though mass media are often regarded as govern-
ment mouthpieces, especially in authoritarian contexts. To investigate the roles of social media and 
mass media on collective mobilization, the paper analyses a citizen self-mobilization (CSM) case 
in Guangzhou, China, through in-depth interviews to conceptualize the interconnected relationship 
between social media and mass media from the perspective of resource mobilization. Instructively, 
the paper reveals that it is the in-depth reporting, and subsequent meaning-making, by the main-
stream mass media that sustains the discussion of social issues, and gives the CSM as a movement 
its own discursive identity.
The four papers, along with this editorial research article, critically engage with the broader 
theme looking at ‘the future of social media and identity movements in China and beyond’. They 
combine to offer glimpses to a critical and conceptual framework to critique the global and local 
complexities, diversity and dynamics resulting from the deeper integration of social media into the 
everyday lives of Chinese Internet users. Reading these pieces aid our understanding of how social 
media is and can be used to wrap personal politics into a widening range of identity groupings 
around gender, class, citizenship, pop culture and religion, in ways that signal the future of newer 
forms of identity politics among Internet users in China, and beyond.
To be sure, there are myriad ways that Chinese people, as media proxies for people from many 
other countries and cultures, are able to enunciate their Internet and social media preferences to 
stake their social, cultural and political identities. What we can see in the selection of papers are 
that each reveals a piece of the emerging digital mediascapes of online communities in a Chinese 
digital culture that is locally ascribed, but also rapidly globalizing. The common and critical thread 
emerging from the various research projects is that the experiences of social media users in China 
often mirror those that lie beyond China. Indeed, we find that many Chinese users are adopting 
practices online that are similar to globalizing cultures of neoliberal capitalism, and data surveil-
lance that Western social media participation brings (Boyd, 2015; Trottier, 2012). From using digi-
tal technologies and social media platforms to influencing political participation, to shifting 
attitudes towards gender and religious representation, conspicuous consumption and audience 
responses to celebrities and stars online, this Special Issue demonstrates the breadth and depth of 
how Chinese social media platforms can re-order and re-regulate society through re-constructing 
identities. Moreover, based on empirical data collected from Chinese Internet users, this issue fur-
ther illustrates how human anxieties, desires for community engagement and social forces can 
shape various Internet applications and uses and expand their influences. When this happens, new 
forms of identity movements would emerge and once again transform and challenge our notions of 
identity. In response to Stuart Hall’s question from back in 1996, ‘Who needs identity?’, we all do. 
As the concluding section that follows would suggest, we are sparked to defend ‘identity’ when 
called upon to do so.
Shareability of identity in COVID-19
In the social media-infused world that all of us inhabit in the current era, where a range of identities 
– from personal, to social and national – are presented, performed, shared and shaped continuously 
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by a variety of state and non-state actors, we are prompted to ask what has social media provided 
that is social, and perhaps, anti-social? Or in the context of this article, we seek to begin interrogat-
ing what we might refer to as the shareability of identity. Indeed, the Web 2.0 social cognitive tools 
of sharing on social networking sites – such as the use of Facebook ‘like’, Twitter ‘re-tweet’, 
emoticons and virtual stamps on Instagram, Weibo and TikTok, virtual polls, crowdsourcing and 
more – can all be used to exchange ideas, create use-values, maintain communities and work 
together (see Fuchs, 2014). But at the same time, social media tools are actively used – and increas-
ingly algorithmically driven – to not only frame and reframe news stories but also seek to influence 
users’ attitudes towards current affairs and social issues, either in negative or positive ways, or 
sometimes a combination of both. In the process of participating in social media discourse, many 
users end up sharing views that either overemphasize their identity status or do not accurately 
reflect their identities at all. For example, China Internet studies scholar Florian Schneider (2018) 
argues that it can be problematic when Chinese social media users raise sensitive issues mixing 
race, ethnicity and nationalism on their anti-Japanese posts, stoking flames of racism, framed as 
expressions of personal, identity politics online.
At the time of putting together this Special Issue (in the first half of 2020), the Novel Coronavirus 
(SARS-CoV-2), subsequently named COVID-19 by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 
February 2020, began to infect most parts of the world. The popular consensus in January 2020 
was that the onset of the virus came from wet markets in Wuhan, China, which traded in live wild-
life. News and media reports intensified rapidly thereafter, resulting in China, as a collective whole, 
being branded and seen as the epicentre of a global pandemic. It was not long before questions and 
representations of identity – specifically Chinese identity – took hold in many parts of the world, 
many of them taking place and emerging from social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook and 
Instagram. It would not be too far off to suggest that the Chinese identity discourse has become 
somewhat embedded within the very mention of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The progressive fallout of COVID-19 meant that most countries have had to respond to the 
health crisis by limiting physical movements, especially in most major cities around the world. By 
the time lockdowns, both fully and partially depending on government edicts, were instituted in 
most parts of the world, the health crisis morphed into an economic crisis which affected most 
major economies around the world from April 2020 onwards. During this time, identity politics 
began to rear its ugly head when words about physical and verbal assaults of anyone who looks 
remotely ‘Chinese’ – but may instead be of Korean, Filipino, even South Asian, descent – began 
circulating online. Identity discourses thus became extremely shareable online because they had 
the effect of either sparking outrage or reinforcing social stereotypes. When categorically labelled 
in a negative manner online, such toxic news stories and social media posts end up exacerbating 
the already difficult COVID-19 health crisis. Opportunistic web users would even seek to exert 
petty or grandiose notions of social justice, feeding upon online conspiracy theories by trying to 
link the virus to bioweaponry experiments emanating from Mainland China. While many have 
simply denounced these as ‘fake news’, these examples of anti-social behaviours that usually begin 
online are effectively spawned by negative discourses of Chinese identity, most of them having 
taken shape well before the COVID-19 pandemic struck.
As early as in January 2020, mainstream media outlets in Australia began calling out racist 
attitudes against people of Chinese descent. The Australian multicultural broadcaster, Special 
Broadcasting Services (SBS), reported on 31 January 2020 how Chinese-Australians were witness-
ing increased levels of hostility and overt racist behaviours since the coronavirus outbreak began 
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(Young, 2020). This took place at a time when the pandemic was not yet declared global, and when 
there were 8100 known cases globally, with 170 deaths and a mere nine confirmed cases in 
Australia. This was also a moment of identity consciousness, with many Chinese-Australians, 
some of whom were Australia-born and have not lived in Asia, beginning to articulate their fears 
over being out in public places. Indeed, the SBS news report also made the point that such identity-
based racism was also found in places like Japan and Singapore. In Japan, a shop in the town of 
Hakone prompted an apology from tourism authorities after it posted a sign reading, ‘No Chinese 
are allowed to enter the store. I do not want to spread the virus’. In Singapore, over 100,000 citi-
zens and permanent residents signed an online petition calling for the government to ban Chinese 
nationals from entering the country (which they did by mid-February) (Young, 2020).
It was telling, however, that while there were online comments, digital vigilantism and apolo-
gies issued during this period of time, formal or official condemnations were few and far between. 
As a result, anti-China sentiments (which are problematic in the first place) morphed into anti-
Chineseness, which in turn became lumped into a convenient anti-Asian identity discourse. Most 
of these encounters either took place within social media, or were enunciated on social media, 
sparking exchanges that were mostly hurtful and unedifying, but they are nevertheless highly 
instructive in demonstrating the fact that identity movements and discourses of representations 
have always been critical, and are just as significant on social media, even if they seem out of sight 
and out of mind.
It was not until April 2020 when Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison explicitly con-
demned racist abuse levelled at Chinese-Australians in an interview with SBS News (Mason, 
2020). On 15 April 2020, one day after the Prime Minister made those comments, disturbing video 
footage of two girls ‘of Asian descent’ being yelled at and physically attacked by two other women 
began circulating on various social media sites; one of the girls was seen being dragged to the 
ground by her hair, kicked and beaten, in what appeared to be a racially motivated attack which 
took place near the Queen Victoria Markets in Melbourne, Australia (Ayling, 2020). It was subse-
quently reported that the victims of racial and identity abuse were ethnically Chinese from Malaysia 
and Singapore, respectively. The Singapore tabloid The New Paper became the first overseas 
newspaper to report this matter 5 days later, on 20 April 2020, expressly referring to the violent 
confrontation as a ‘racist attack’. It was noted that Melbourne’s Channel Nine News reported that 
the students were also told to ‘go back to China’ and were attacked when they responded to the 
taunts (Sun, 2020). As this particular incident was seen as a crime that affected on the identity 
consciousness not just of being a Chinese national (which both victims were not), but also of the 
risk of being identified as such, it became one of the most widely reported racist episodes during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, certainly within the Asian region.
This issue sparked sufficient outrage that a series of comments and condemnations began to 
emerge within Australia, with the following sets of official statements made by various authorities 
and associations crowding further discussions and debates on the matter:
•• Victoria Police condemned the act and moved very quickly to arrest and charge a 21-year-
old Melbourne woman in relation to the case.
•• The University of Melbourne’s Vice Chancellor Duncan Maskell identified the victims as 
international students of the University and condemned the attack: ‘This is a disgusting and 
unprovoked attack on two of our female students. These senseless and vicious attacks on 
two young women must never be tolerated in our community. The people who did this are a 
disgrace’ (Sun, 2020).
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•• Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a statement on 19 April 2020 that it 
was aware of the latest incident, and that the Singapore High Commission in Canberra was 
already in touch with the Singaporean student to render consular assistance. The MFA added 
that ‘the High Commission is also reaching out to local authorities to ensure the incident is 
investigated and dealt with in accordance with the law’ (cited in Sun, 2020).
•• The Malaysia and Singapore Society of Australia (MASSA) was the first scholarly associa-
tion – and appropriately so, given that the two victims were Malaysian and Singaporean, 
respectively – to issue a statement condemning the act. The full statement, issued on 
MASSA’s social media (Facebook) page, even offered a recollection of the incident as fol-
lows: ‘MASSA expresses our concern that there has been an increase in overt racism against 
Asians and Asian international students in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. On 15 
April 2020, two “ethnic Chinese” international students were racially abused and assaulted 
on Elizabeth Street in Melbourne. This racially-motivated attack was reported by newspa-
pers and television stations in Australia and Singapore, including The Age, Seven News, 
ABC News, SBS News, The Straits Times and The New Paper. The incident was largely 
reported as an attack on “Chinese students” but both of them are actually ethnic Chinese 
students from Malaysia and Singapore. This unwarranted attack on the two students on the 
basis of their ethnicity is not acceptable in a country that emphasizes its multicultural char-
acter. Asian-background students – whether international students or Australian – should in 
no circumstances be threatened in such a way. International students come to Australia not 
only to study but to experience and appreciate living in this great country. We condemn the 
irresponsible and racially-motivated attack on the two students. We trust the police will fully 
investigate this incident’.1
•• The Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA) issued a statement on 7 May 2020 
which took specific note of ‘recent reports of attacks and intimidation directed against peo-
ple of Asian backgrounds in Australia in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the 
attribution of blame by some people to Chinese and, by extension, all Asian people, for the 
virus’. The ASAA undertook a historical approach in framing its condemnation of racism 
and prejudice by enunciating how such ‘blaming of people of Asian background for a global 
pandemic recalls long histories of racism and exclusion in Australia’. The President of 
ASAA, Edward Aspinall, as signatory to the statement declared, ‘As an Association whose 
members work towards achieving greater understanding of Asian societies in Australia, we 
affirm our absolute commitment to opposition to all forms of racism and discrimination, and 
deplore these incidents. Such attacks have no place in a tolerant and inclusive society such 
as we seek to build in Australia. Racism is deplorable under any circumstance but is particu-
larly damaging at a time of global crisis when people of good will are called upon to work 
together to confront our common challenges. Noting that some of these incidents have been 
directed at students from Asian countries, we express our particular support for international 
students and the role they play as a vital and positive part of Australia’s higher education 
system and community. The Association calls upon all members, universities, relevant 
authorities and members of the wider community to stand against racism and to work 
together in pursuit of an inclusive and diverse society’.2
Perhaps, the most noteworthy response by the Australian Asian community was an online peti-
tion titled ‘Denounce racist attacks on Asian-Australians: #UnityOverFear during Covid-19’ which 
was launched on the popular website change.org on 14 April 2020.3 The petition was started by the 
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Chinese Australian Forum (CAF), a non-partisan body established in 1985 to provide the Chinese 
community with a voice in the Australian political process, and it sagaciously utilizes the shareabil-
ity of identity and of social media to mobilize Asians in Australia, and arguably elsewhere, to call 
out for social and political action against anti-Asian – and therefore, anti-Chinese – sentiments. 
Within a month of its launch, the petition – itself a form of identity movement that is enhanced by 
social media – had recorded more than 55,000 signatures.
When the Australian Asian community responded to the anti-Chinese-ness that bears ethnical, 
cultural and historical underpinnings, the audiences, users and participants of the Internet in 
Mainland China almost synchronized these events into their own identity discourse and move-
ments, which showed a strong nationalist twist. ‘The fragmented and fractured’ identities seemed 
to be organized, at least momentarily, under the heightened consciousness of being a (both politi-
cally and culturally) Chinese. Besides reporting the attacks, condemning the predators, sympathiz-
ing with the victims and confirming the identity loyalty, some social media discourses went 
overboard to fabricate fake news to advocate for nationalist sentiments (Huang, 2020). The spe-
cific historical and institutional sites of Chinese social media, as revealed by the papers in this 
Special Issue, help to understand this nationalist movement in virtual communities during the 
pandemic. Social media content creators (see Xu, this issue) perpetuated consumption (of both 
physical goods and immaterial products) through forming a para-social relationship with their 
audiences. The emergence of nationalist content in Chinese social media partially followed this 
logic – the content was sold to the audiences as a product that makes them feel good about their 
nationalist identity, especially when the identity faced severe external challenges. The lines 
between multiple identities are indeed blurred in the online space, as suggested by Sng and Lee’s 
(this issue) piece. Religious identity could be discussed as a form of popular culture. Nationalist 
identity could be presented as a piece of fan object, in which fans (or Chinese citizens) invest their 
passion and money. However, what distinguishes the blurring of identity boundaries during this 
pandemic is the high shareability between social media and mass media discourses. As Xi (this 
issue) argued, without the reporting and meaning-making by mass media, the discussion of a cer-
tain social issue (e.g. nationalist movement) cannot be sustained. The ‘blame game’ between 
Chinese official voices and the United States (Boxwell, 2020) was widely covered by both Chinese 
social media and mass media, with an emphasis on ridiculing the American side. The mutual scru-
tiny was largely mediated by the Internet, as evidenced in how spokesmen from both governments 
used Twitter to lay their blames. Such mediated scrutiny (see Huang et al., this issue) was done by 
social media participants too; but the scrutiny was by no means balanced and comprehensive. 
Rather, the scrutinized information was often truncated and interpreted to fit into the existing 
‘enunciative strategies’ and ‘modalities of power’ in the local contexts.
Conclusion
It would be remiss for us to conclude this editorial article in a negative light because identity dis-
courses can be very positively social too. In a positive turn online during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
‘feel good’ news stories, and social media posts – especially those paying tribute to health profes-
sionals, cleaners and other front-line workers battling the health pandemic – have swung to the 
other extreme, promoting online solidarity, displacing racial divisions with other forms of identity. 
In particular, humour, satire, inspirational and personal stories play on our identity politics on 
social media as well, connecting with web users’ daily realities, projecting citizens’ hopes, frustra-
tions and feelings in a positive, reaffirming way.
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After Wuhan and other Chinese cities were featured in the online news media with balcony-
singing, midnight karaoke sessions cheering their citizens on, other major cities like Hong Kong, 
Italy and London followed suit. In Singapore, ground-up initiatives inspired by social media 
posts saw a British expatriate Martin Verga, who has been living in Singapore for a decade, suc-
cessfully organize a ‘Clap For #SGUnited’ mass-applause event on 30 March 2020 via Facebook. 
He had been inspired by a similar event in the United Kingdom, #ClapforNHS, which saw mil-
lions of Britons, including Prime Minister Boris Johnson, applauding National Health Service 
staff (Goh, 2020).
A less officious version of such online movements is the popular Singaporean comic blogger 
turned Youtuber ‘Mr Brown’, who uses his alter ego ‘Kim Huat’ to share videos commenting on 
his WFM or ‘work from home’ experience during Singapore’s euphemistically named ‘circuit 
breaker’ period between April to June 2020.4 Appealing to Singaporeans primarily, the satirical 
videos would make light of real daily challenges of working from home, using local vernacular in 
the form of dialects and ‘Singlish’ (a brand of Singapore English), while also appealing to people 
to adhere to government-instituted lockdown restrictions for the sake of everybody’s health. By 
sharing his identity as a fellow citizen who has to adhere to government edicts, while practicing 
‘social distancing’ and other health measures, ‘Mr Brown’ was in essence engaging in ‘social 
presencing’ by speaking – both directly and indirectly, explicitly and implicitly – to the unified, 
personal concerns of every digital and social media user. After all, the global pandemic that is 
COVID-19 is a personal one, which can infect and affect anyone and everyone. Because social 
media makes identity expression and identity movements shareable, Stuart Hall’s question of 
‘Who needs identity?’ in the context of this article and journal issue is an easy one to answer. 
Anyone and everyone.
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Notes
1. This statement was issued via the Facebook page of MASSA, signed by Yeow-Tong Chia 
(President) and Jason Lim (Secretary-Treasurer), dated 22 April 2020: https://www.facebook.com/
groups/120889542112480/.
2. The full statement is lodged on the website of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA), with 
the direct link retrievable here: http://asaa.asn.au/news/asaa-statement-on-recent-racist-attacks-in-aus-
tralia-a-message-from-the-asaa-executive/?mc_cid=7df7f1a97d&mc_eid=239598881b.
3. https://www.change.org/p/denounce-racist-attacks-on-asian-australians-unityoverfear-during-covid-19.
4. Mr Brown, whose real name is Lee Kin Mun, describes himself as ‘Blogfather of Singapore, satirist, 
writer, traveler, podcaster & boss of new media company’. His YouTube videos are available on his 
website: mrbrown.com.
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